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COMMENTS 
The Act of State Doctrine after Sabbatino 
The United States Supreme Court recently decided, in Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,1 that American courts must enforce a 
recognized foreign government's expropriation decree2 even though 
the decree violates international law. The Court, contrary to the 
views of respected international lawyers,3 found this result dictated 
by the "act of state doctrine," which bars American courts from 
reviewing the validity of another nation's official acts.4 The decision, 
amid frequent revolutionary confiscations and national programs of 
expropriation,5 seriously draws into question the wisdom of further 
investments in developing countries.6 This is unfortunate because 
American foreign investments benefit the receiving country as well 
as the investor and ultimately contribute to international cooperation 
and world peace.7 This comment explores the meaning and scope 
of the act of state doctrine, as the Supreme Court applied it in 
Sabbatino. 
I. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), reversing 307 F.2d 
845 (2d Cir. 1962) [hereinafter referred to in text as Sabbatino and cited as principal 
case]. The major exception to act of state immunity for foreign acts of state occurs when 
the State Department relieves the court of the restraint upon its jurisdiction by official 
notification-the so-called Bernstein letter-that the executive does not object to 
judicial review of the foreign act in question. Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Ameri-
kaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954), reversing 173 F.2d 71 
(2d Cir. 1949). In the principal case, the Court expressly refused to consider the scope 
or continuing validity of the Bernstein exception. Principal case at 420, 436. 
2. "Expropriation" is the taking or using of property by public authority with 
adequate compensation, while "confiscation" is the taking of property without ade-
quate compensation. See RE, FOREIGN CONFISCATION IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw 12 (1951). 
Normally, however, neither courts nor attorneys use these terms precisely. In the text, 
reference is made to Cuba's taking as an expropriation decree despite the Court's 
finding that it was confiscatory because the plan for compensation was illusory. 
Principal case at 401-02. 
3. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT'L LAw OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW 
YORK, REPORT, A CONSIDERATION OF THE Acr OF STATE DocnuNE IN UNITED STATES 
COURTS (1959); Hyde, The Act of State Doctrine and The Rule of Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 635 (1959); Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959). But 
see Reeves, Act of State Doctrine and the Rule of Law-A Reply, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 
141 (1960). 
4. See note 20 infra and accompanying text. 
5. Seizures of private foreign investments have recently occurred in Brazil, Ceylon, 
Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq and Iran, to name just a few. COMM. ON INT'L TRADE AND 
INV., SEcrION OF INT'L & COMP. LAW, ABA, REPORT ON THE PROTEGrION OF PRIVATE 
PROPERTY INVESTED ABROAD 2 (1963). See generally Dawson & Weston, Banco Nacional 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino: New Wine in Old Bottles, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 63, 67-72 (1963). 
6. See generally Lillich, The Protection of Foreign Investment and the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1962, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 405-07 (1963). 
7. Remarks by Roger M. Blough, The William Penn Award Dinner of the Philadel-
phia Chamber of Commerce, May 19, 1964, in U.S. Steel Corp., The Tie That Binds 
5-6 (undated pamphlet). 
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I. THE Sab batino FACTS 
In February and July of 1960, a New York commodity broker 
contracted to purchase sugar from C.A.V.,8 a Cuban corporation 
owned almost entirely by American nationals.9 When, on July 6, 
1960, the United States Congress amended the Sugar Act of 194810 
to permit the President to reduce the sugar quota allotted to Cuba,11 
the Cuban Council of Ministers responded by authorizing the expro-
priation of American property in Cuba.12 Pursuant to this decree, 
the Cuban government promulgated a resolution expressly nationaliz-
ing C.A.V. and its subsidiaries.13 As a condition of permitting the 
sugar to be transported from Cuba, the government exacted a second 
purchase contract from the broker, which it then assigned to Banco 
Nacional, a Cuban governmental agency. When the broker resold the 
sugar, a New York state court, finding C.A.V. to have been the right-
ful ovmer, awarded the proceeds to a New York receiver appointed 
to manage the assets of C.A.V.14 
Banco Nacional then brought an action in a federal district court 
against both the broker and the receiver, alleging conversion of the 
sale proceeds. The broker defended by challenging Cuba's claim of 
title to the sugar, arguing that the purported expropriation failed to 
pass title to the sugar to the Cuban government because the taking 
violated international law. Banco Nacional, relying on the act of 
state doctrine, asserted that American courts may not question the 
validity of its title obtained by expropriation. The district court 
ruled that, while the doctrine precludes courts from testing the 
validity of the seizure under Cuban law or under the forum's public 
policy, it does not prevent such examination under principles of 
international law. Having found the taking to be invalid under inter-
national law because discriminatory, confiscatory, and retaliatory, 
the court granted summary judgment for the defendants.15 The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that Cuba's 
8. Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba. 
9. Principal case at 401. 
IO. Act of July 6, 1960, § 3, 74 Stat. 330, amending 61 Stat. 933 (1947). 
ll. The following day, July 7, 1960, the President greatly reduced the sugar quota 
allotted to Cuba. Proc. No. 3355, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414 Ouly 1960). 
12. Law No. 851, July 6, 1960, 22 Leyes del Gobiemo Provisional de la Revoluci6n 
29 (Cuba), English translation in 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 822 (1961). 
13. Exec. Power Res. No. 1 of August 6, 1960, English translation in 193 F. Supp. 
375, 382-83 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
14. Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba, 28 Misc. 2d 
355, 208 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd, 12 App. Div. 2d 506, 207 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1960) 
(memorandum decision). N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1202(a)(4) authorizes the appointment 
of a receiver for the New York assets of nationalized foreign corporations. 
15. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Courts of other nations have reviewed expro-
priations under international law. See Mann, International Delinquencies Before 
Municipal Courts, 70 L.Q. REv. 181 (1954). 
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expropriation violated international law on the narrower ground 
that the taking was not for a public purpose, but was designed instead 
to discriminate against the United States and its nationals.16 The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the act of state doctrine pre-
cludes judicial review of foreign acts of state regardless of any viola-
tion of international law.17 
II. THE Acr OF STATE Docrn.1NE 
Under established principles of national sovereignty, a nation has 
absolute authority to govern within its own territory unless re-
strained by a rule of international law.18 Consistent with this princi-
ple, although not required by international law,19 the act of state 
doctrine provides that an act of a foreign state directed against per-
sons or property within its territorial jurisdiction is immune from 
review by American courts.20 An "act of state" requires the creation 
and publication of the sovereign's will, the physical imposition of 
the sovereign's will upon persons or property, and a judicial con-
fi.rmation.21 It is "an act in which the state has determined or is 
seeking to determine an interest of its own as a state, as distinguished 
from an act in which the state is seeking to determine an interest of 
a private nature."22 Typical acts within the doctrine are executive 
16. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962). See Falk, The Case of Banco Nadonal de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino Before the Supreme Court of the United States, 9 How. L.J. 116, 120-22 
(1963). 
17. See note 1 supra. The Court concluded that "there are few if any issues in 
international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on 
a State's power to expropriate the property of aliens." Principal case at 428. Compare, 
McNair, The Seizure of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia, 6 NETHERLANDS INT'L 
L. REv. 218, 243-53 (1959) and REsTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 190-95 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) [hereinafter cited as REsTATEMENT], 
with Lissitzyn, International Law in a Divided World, INT'L CONCILIATION No. 542, at 46 
(1963) and Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of 
Universal International Law?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 863 (1961). 
18. The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (Mar• 
shall, C.J.): "The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily 
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself." See 
BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 162 (6th ed. 1963). 
19. See 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 115 (Lauterpacht, 8th ed. 1955). 
20. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See Comment, "Act of State" 
Immunity, 57 YALE L.J. 108, 111-15 (1947). 
21. Reeves, The Sabbatino Case: The Supreme Court of the United States Rejuts a 
Proposed New Theory of Sovereign Relations and Restores the Act of State Doctrine, 
32 FORDHAM L. REv. 631, 647-49 (1964). In Sabbatino, the sovereign's will appeared in 
legislation and related resolutions; seizure occurred when Cuba refused to permit the 
loaded vessel to depart; and, finally, judicial confirmation was inherent in the legisla-
tion because it expressly precluded judicial review by Cuban courts. Thus, the act 
of state was complete. 
22. INTERNATIONAL LAw 1N NATIONAL COURTS 64 (Third Cornell Summer Conference 
on International Law 1960) [hereinafter cited as THIRD CORNELL SUMMER CONFERENCE]. 
"The expression, however, ••• obviously may, and is in fact often intended to, 
include legislative and judicial acts such as a statute, decree or order, or a judgment 
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and legislative measures giving effect to governmental decisions on 
major issues of policy, such as ownership of property, taxation, regu-
lation of business enterprise, and the distribution of goods in the 
economy. Although foreign judgments presented for enforcement 
are not acts of state,23 the seizure or sale of property pursuant thereto 
must be recognized in American courts.24 
An act of state, then, is an application of the right to govern; the 
act of state doctrine is a foreign sovereign's recognition of that right. 
Although not as widely accepted as the principle of sovereign im-
munity,211 this doctrine confers broader immunity, extending beyond 
the sovereign to private parties claiming title under a governmental 
act.26 The doctrine is generally regarded neither as a strict interna-
tional obligation nor as a constitutional mandate, but as a judicial 
restraint, self-imposed to avoid embarrassing the executive in the 
conduct of foreign relations.27 American courts have applied the 
doctrine strictly, even though the foreign government had ceased to 
exist before the suit was instituted28 or had not been recognized by 
the United States at the time of the act in question.29 Moreover, it 
has been applied even though the foreign state's act was illegal under 
its own laws,30 illegal under international law,31 or contrary to the 
forum's public policy.32 ' 
An exception to act of state immunity is made, however, if the 
litigation involves a gross violation of United States public policy 
and the Department of State expresses its approval of judicial re-
view of the foreign state's act. In Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-
Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,33 the Second Circuit con-
sidered an act by the German government that, in 1937, had com-
pelled the transfer of title of a German merchant fleet. The court 
of a superior Court." Mann, The Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State, 59 L.Q. 
R.Ev. 42 (1943). 
23. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). "[F]oreign judgments which might equally 
be regarded as emanations of state, have been challenged even in United States courts 
on ground of fraud, fairness of procedure, existence of jurisdiction; and have also 
been denied conclusive effect when there has been a lack of reciprocity. Zander, supra 
note 3, at 833-34. 
24. THlllD CORNELL SUMMER CONFERENCE 64. 
25. See BISHOP, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 550-620 (2d ed. 1962). 
26. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). 
27. Principal case at 423. "It is a matter of international comity ••• not a matter 
of jurisdiction." TH!llD CORNELL SUMMER CoNFERENCE, at 122 (comment by Judge Fahy). 
28. E.g., Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
332 U.S. 772 (1947). 
29. E.g., M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933). 
30. E.g., Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438,444 (2d Cir. 1940). 
Accord, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
31. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918). 
32. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
332 U.S. 772 (1947). 
33. Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954), rroersing 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949). · 
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held that the validity of the transfer was not open to question in 
American courts. However, upon receipt of a communication from 
the State Department to the effect that its policy was "to relieve 
American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their juris-
diction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials," the 
court granted a rehearing and reversed its decision.84 
In the typical act of state case, the former owner of property sues 
the present mvner, an assignee of the expropriating government.85 
The reluctance of a court to review the validity of the defendant's 
title reflects, in part, a desire to render titles secure, for if the plain-
tiff is allowed to prevail the loss would fall upon a third-party pur-
chaser for value, who could then be left without effective remedy 
against the foreign government that sold the property. Therefore, 
the defendant is permitted to invoke the act of state doctrine.36 In 
such cases, the foreign government whose act is questioned is not a 
litigant, nor is it directly affected by the decision. In addition to 
this typical case, it may occur that the plaintiff, rather than the 
defendant, will rely upon the doctrine to establish its right to prop-
erty as against the pre-expropriation owner who has managed to 
regain possession. Here again the doctrine seems applicable because 
' security of titles is equally as desirable to protect plaintiffs as 
defendants.87 However, if the plaintiff receiving the benefit of the 
act of state doctrine is the sovereign itself, application of the doc-
trine can no longer be justified as securing titles because the expro-
priating state is not a purchaser for value. If rendering titles secure 
were the doctrine's only justification, it would seem equitable to 
hold that by submitting to the court's jurisdiction the sovereign has 
waived its protection. But, as the Court emphasized in Sabbatino, 
the doctrine is also intended to prevent disruption of the United 
States' relations with the acting foreign government. 
In Sabbatino the policy of securing titles was not directly under 
consideration because it was the expropriating state itself, as plaintiff, 
that invoked the act of state doctrine in its suit to enforce its own 
expropriation decree.38 The United States, as amicus curiae, never-
theless argued that the doctrine should apply in all appropriate cases, 
34. Ibid. In Sabbatino, the State Department urged application of the act of state 
doctrine to the expropriation in question. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
pp. 9-11, reprinted in 2 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1009 (1963). The Court expressly refused to 
consider the scope or the continuing vitality of the Bernstein exception. Principal case 
at 420,436. 
35. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). 
36. E.g., National Institute of Agrarian Reform v. Kane, 153 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 
Ct. App. 1963). See generally Reeves, supra note 3; Zander, supra note 3. 
37. Note, 75 HAR.v. L. REv. 1607, 1618 (1962). 
38. THIRD CORNELL SUMMER CONFERENCE 72 (comment by Mr. Stevenson). The 
decision "in effect, requires that all the force of the United States' judicial and execu-
tive agencies be utilized to protect property confiscated in violation of international 
law except where the confiscating government has itself expressly agreed to the princi-
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whether invoked affirmatively or defensively. The administration of 
the doctrine, it urged in its brief, should not encourage the private 
use of force or deception against the acting foreign government or 
its assignee, an obvious result if a distinction is drawn between the 
typical suit in which the doctrine is invoked by the defendant and 
a suit in which the doctrine is relied upon by plaintiff. On the sepa-
rate question of whether the doctrine is properly applicable when 
the expropriating state relies on the doctrine, the United States 
argued that "An act of state dealing with title to property is nonethe-
less involved, and no beneficial purpose would be served by per-
mitting Cuba's assignee for value, but not Cuba, to maintain suit on 
the title."89 
III. THE Sabbatino HOLDING 
The Court did not discuss the question whether there is a mean-
ingful difference between reliance on the act of state doctrine by 
a defendant and such reliance by a plaintiff, although it implied that 
there is none. The Court did specifically refuse, however, to distin-
g1,1ish between suits by sovereign states and those brought by as-
signees, because to do so would require a difficult examination in 
each case to determine if the private party suing as assignee had taken 
the property in good faith.40 The clear implication is that the doc-
trine applies in any case where the foreign act or decree is the proper 
rule for decision, regardless of whether the acting state or its assignee 
is plaintiff, defendant, or totally unconnected with that particular 
litigation.41 The Court also rejected an attempt to challenge, by 
means of a counterclaim, the validity of Cuba's expropriation. The 
defendant, drawing an analogy between the act of state doctrine and 
sovereign immunity, had argued that the plaintiff had waived act of 
state immunity by filing the action, thus permitting a counterclaim.42 
The Court answered that, "Since the act of state doctrine proscribes 
a challenge to the validity of the Cuban expropriation decree in this 
case, any counterclaim based on asserted invalidity must fail."43 
The Court asserted that the act of state doctrine derives neither 
from the inherent nature of sovereignty, nor from international 
law, nor from the Constitution; but because it reflects a "strong 
sense" among the judiciary that passing on the validity of the acts of 
foreign governments might "hinder rather than further this country's 
pies it is violating." Stevenson, The State Department and Sabbatino-"Ev'n Victors 
Are by Victories Undone," 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 707 (1964). 
39. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 24, reprinted in 2 INT'L LEG. 
MAT, 1009 (1963). 
40. Principal case at 437. . 
41. Cf. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 
(1938). 
42. Principal case at 438. 
43. Id. at 439. 
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pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as 
a whole in the international sphere,"44 it does have "constitutional 
underpinnings." The Court specifically suggested that, in pending 
litigation, when international authorities conflict or the international 
legal issue touches "sharply on national nerves," American courts 
should refrain from fully exercising their jurisdiction. Thus, the 
fundamental role of the act of state doctrine, as envisaged by Sab-
batino, is to prevent international conflicts. 
Because prior Supreme Court decisions had enunciated the doc-
trine in sweeping terms,45 with little analysis or explanation, a rather 
careful consideration of the holding seems appropriate: 
"Therefore, rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible 
rule and all-encompassing rule in this case, we decide only that 
the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of 
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign govern-
ment, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, 
in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement re-
garding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint 
alleges that the taking violates customary international law."46 
I. "A taking." A country is free, absent a specific agreement,47 
to "take" for public use any property located within its territory.48 
A government may exercise this right in various ways, including 
eminent domain, taxation, and the police power. Under the act of 
state doctrine, a condition of recognizing the validity of a foreign act 
of state is that the act be completed by actual possession of the prop-
erty;49 an executory decree does not merit act of state immunity. 
The Court stated that Cuba's restraint of the loaded vessel and its 
insistence that a new contract be signed before releasing the vessel 
"must be regarded for these purposes to have constituted an effective 
taking of the sugar, vesting in Cuba C.A.V.'s property right in it.''50 
44. Id. at 423. In our constitutional system the executive, rather than the judiciary 
or the legislature, is assumed to have primary responsibility for these matters. 
45. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897): "Every sovereign State is 
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of 
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done 
within its own territory." 
46. Principal case at 428. 
47. "[T]hat kind of agreement is so rare as to be practically non-existent." Metzger, 
Property in International Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 594, 608 (1964). See notes 78-82 infra 
and accompanying text. 
48. See, e.g., R.EsrATEMENT § 190; FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN 
!NVESfORS 50-54 (1962). 
49. See Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808). 
50. Principal case at 414. (Emphasis added.) The treatment a government accords 
its own nationals is considered a domestic affair, while the treatment a government 
accords aliens is governed by international law and may give rise to international 
claims. For purposes of the act of state doctrine, however, the nationality of the victim 
is irrelevant, since the Court in Sabbatino refused to establish an exception to act of 
state immunity when international law is violated. 
January 1965] A ct of State Doctrine 535 
2. "Of property." No limitation on the kinds of property a gov-
ernment may take has ever been imposed under the act of state doc-
trine. In this respect, the only limitation is that the property be 
within the jurisdiction of the acting government.51 
3. "Within its own territory." Under conflict of laws rules, ex-
ecutory foreign decrees are enforced only to the extent that such 
enforcement does not violate the public policy of the forum.52 When 
a decree is executed within the foreign state's own borders, however, 
American courts are required by the act of state doctrine to ignore 
the normal conflicts rules and to recognize the validity of the act as 
well as its effects.53 On the other hand, if a state purports to transfer 
title to property located outside its borders, act of state immunity 
does not apply.54 In Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine applied 
because the sugar was located within the Cuban territory at the time 
of expropriation.115 
4. "By a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by 
this country at the time of suit." The act of state doctrine applies 
only to acts of a regime recognized by the executive as the governing 
authority.156 During a revolution, for example, when opposing fac-
tions each claim to be the sole legitimate government, the executive's 
official recognition of one of the claimants binds American courts to 
apply act of state immunity to the official acts of that regime.57 When 
the expropriating state is a party to the litigation, the act of state 
doctrine is justified by the need to avoid disturbing the peace of 
nations.158 It is obvious, therefore, that if the acting government no 
longer exists, there is little possibility of adversely affecting our 
foreign relations, and act of state immunity should not apply.159 
51. REsl'ATEMENT § 190. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that Cuba 
had merely attempted to expropriate contractual rights which had their locus else-
where. 
52. E.g., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). See generally 
Paulsen 8c Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLuM. L. REv. 969 
(1956). 
53. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); REsl'ATEMENT § 43. 
54. See, e.g., Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York 8c Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 
20 N.E.2d 758 (1939), affd per curiam, 309 U.S. 624 (1940). Courts nevertheless have 
given extraterritorial effect to a foreign decree when it is required by an executive 
agreement. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
55. In Sabbatino, the Court said that any Cuban action with regard to property not 
within its jurisdiction would be ineffective. Principal case at 413 n.14. See Rodriguez 
v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962). 
56. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); REsl'ATEMENT § 45. 
57. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., supra note 56. 
58. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. 
59. This is certainly true if a new foreign government has repudiated the govern-
ment whose act is challenged, for then it might be more of an affront to the new 
government to apply the acts of its predecessor as law than to refuse to do so. Falk, 
'!he Complexity of Sabbatino, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 935, 943 (1964). In the Bernstein 
case, the acting government was no longer in existence, so it is arguable that the court 
of appeals should not even have discussed the act of state doctrine. THIRD CORNELL 
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The minimum prerequisite for establishing the existence of a 
government is that its agents be in control of the nation's administra-
tion, territory, and inhabitants.60 But even when a regime is actually 
exercising sovereignty in the name of a state, it may not be recognized 
by other governments.61 Once recognition occurs, the regime ac-
quires equal status with other recognized members of the family of 
nations and normally exchanges diplomatic representatives with the 
recognizing state. The transition of a regime from actual existence 
to recognition by other states has little relation to the authority of 
the ruling group over its own territory, but is related instead to 
matters of international diplomacy.62 
It has been argued that applications of the act of state doctrine 
should not be limited to recognized governments and that the courts 
themselves should determine the juridical status or existence of the 
government.63 In 1962, however, the Restatement of the Foreign Re-
lations Law of the United States, without citing authority, asserted 
that the doctrine applies only to acts performed "by a regime that is 
recognized as the government of that state by the state asked to 
examine the validity of the act."64 This view contemplates that the 
determination of whether the acting government is existing and 
recognized be made by the executive branch.65 In Sabbatino, the 
Court limited its holding to situations where the United States 
recognizes the acting government, thereby apparently adopting the 
Restatement view. But the Court did not expressly preclude the 
application of act of state immunity to acts of unrecognized govern-
ments; thus the controversy cannot yet be considered fully settled. 
Under the Restatement, it is not necessary for the acting state to 
have been recognized at the time of the act in issue, although recogni-
tion must occur before entry of judgment in the case. This follows 
from the retroactive recognition principle whereby "such recogni-
tion is retroactive in effect and validates all the actions and conduct 
of the government so recognized from the commencement of its 
existence."66 The Court, by adding to its holding the phrase, "at the 
time of suit," affirmed this element of the act of state doctrine. 
The withdrawal of diplomatic representatives does not affect dip-
SuMMER CONFERENCE 75 (comment by Mr. Re). See note 1 supra and notes 3!l-!l4 
supra and accompanying text. 
60. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1877). Even when no government is 
recognized, the state may exist. See REsTATEMENT § 102, at 361-62. 
61. 2 WHITEMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1, at 3, 17-18 (1963). 
62. See generally "WHITEMAN, op. cit. supra note 61, at 1-18. 
63. RE, FOREIGN CONFISCATION IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw 58-65 (1951). See M. Sali-
moff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933). 
64. REsTATEMENT § 45 (hereinafter referred to in text as Restatement]. 
65. See Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(Clark, J., dissenting). 
66. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918). 
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lomatic recognition, nor is a country considered unrecognized merely 
because it becomes unfriendly.67 It would seem, however, that if 
diplomacy is the appropriate remedy for takings that violate inter-
national law, as the State Department insisted,68 the logical test for 
application of the act of state doctrine would not be recognition, but 
rather the maintenance of diplomatic relations.69 
5. "In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement 
regarding controlling legal principles." It could be argued that this 
element of the Court's holding seems to foreclose American courts 
from ever using the principles of customary international law to re-
view foreign acts of state affecting property, because no review is per-
mitted unless the acting state has recognized the "controlling legal 
principles"70 by entering into an agreement which, by definition, 
would be determinative without resort to principles of customary 
international law. Besides treaties, conventions, protocols, and other 
"contracts" between states, 71 agreements between a private party and 
a state can establish such controlling principles. For example, under-
developed countries sometimes execute "concession contracts" with 
foreign nationals for the exploitation of natural resources. Often such 
contracts contain a clause in which the government agrees not to ex-
propriate the property of the foreign entrepreneur for a period of 
time. If, during the term stipulated in the clause, the host country 
exercises its "sovereign right" to take the foreign national's assets, 
act of state immunity should not apply because there exists a con-
trolling agreement. 72 
However, the full scope of this "agreements" exception to act of 
state immunity is difficult to assess. Even in the absence of an agree-
ment expressly binding the country whose act is challenged, a court 
might discover an "unambiguous agreement regarding controlling 
legal principles" in customary international law. For example, it is 
interesting to consider the effect of a United Nations' General As-
sembly resolution containing applicable legal principles.73 The Gen-
67. WHITEMAN, op. cit. supra note 61, at 27. 
68. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 28-29, reprinted in 2 INT'L 
LEG. MAT. 1009 (1963). 
69. Stevenson, supra note 38, at 710. Cf. Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 417 (1964). 
70. Principal case at 428. However, the Court disclaimed the intention of broadly 
foreclosing American courts from considering questions of international law. Id. at 
430 n.34. Moreover, at several points in the opinion, the Court relied upon inter-
national law. Laylin, Holding Invalid Acts Contrary to International Law-A Force 
Toward Compliance, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. Sec'y OF INT'L LAW 33, 34-36 (1964). 
71. For a brief survey of the existing treaty provisions affecting the security and 
protection of United States property and investment in foreign countries, see COMM. 
ON !NT'L TRADE 8e INV., SECTION OF !NT'L 8e COMP. LAW, ABA, REPORT ON THE PRO• 
TECTION OF PRIVATE PROP.ER.TY INVESTED ABROAD 39-58 (1963). 
72. Cf. Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 572 (1960). 
But cf. Metzger, supra note 47, at 607. 
73. In the United Nations during the past decade, member nations that need 
capital have nevertheless sponsored a series of resolutions intended to declare their un-
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eral Assembly is not an international legislature, and its pronounce-
ments are not law, but they constitute evidence of customary 
international law in the absence of vocal protests by disapproving 
members. 74 Moreover, there is some indication that, as underde-
veloped nations acquire voting control of the Assembly, they are 
seeking to raise its resolutions to the status of law.75 Thus, if a foreign 
government's expropriation were challenged under a relevant Gen-
eral Assembly resolution, it is not impossible that an American court 
would consider the resolution an "unambiguous agreement regarding 
legal principles" and refuse to apply the act of state doctrine. This 
result is possible not only if the acting government voted for the 
resolution but also if the resolution were passed by a large majority 
and the acting government had failed to object. 
More difficulty inheres in estimating the effect, under the "agree-
ments" exception in Sabbatino, of pronouncements by a multi-
national convention for the protection of foreign investments76 that 
is adhered to by most members of the family of nations but not 
the country whose act is challenged. Such a treaty represents "the 
customs and usages of civilized nations" and, therefore, constitutes 
evidence of customary international law.77 In such a case, it is per-
haps unlikely, but not impossible, that an American court would 
find this to be an agreement containing controlling legal principles 
and would refuse to apply act of state immunity. 
IV. FUTURE .APPLICATION OF THE Acr OF STATE DOCTRINE 
Because the Court restricted its holding to takings of property, 78 
foreign acts of state outside the expropriation area may be reviewed 
by the courts even though there is no controlling written agreement. 
More important, even when an expropriation occurred within 
the territory of a "foreign sovereign government, extant and recog-
nized at the time of suit," American courts still possess discretion 
to review the act's validity under principles of customary inter-
fettered sovereignty over the economic activities carried on in their countries. COMM. 
ON !NT'L TRADE &: !NV., op. cit. supra note 71, at 10. 
74. See generally Hyde, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources, 
50 AM. J. !NT'L L. 854, 864-66 (1956); Sloan, The Binding Force of a "Recommenda• 
tion" of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 25 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1 (1948). 
75. See statement of A. B. Perera of Ceylon. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc., 16th Sess., 
6th Comm. 131, (A/AC.6/SR.716) (1961); see other statements in the 6th Comm., 17th 
Sess., particularly those by representatives of Iran (U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc., 17th 
Sess., 6th Comm. 144 (A/AC.6/SR. 762) (1962), and Ceylon (id. at 149, SR. 76!1). 
76. In the type of multilateral treaty most frequently proposed, the participating 
nations would agree to certain basic rights that capital importing countries would 
then assure to investing aliens. COMM. ON INT'L TRADE INv., op. cit supra note 71, 
at 3. 
77. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
78. Principal case at 428. 
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national law rather than to apply the act of state doctrine. The 
exercise of this discretion is to be governed by two broad standards. 
First, act of state immunity should apply when the consensus as to 
relevant international legal rules is insufficient to permit a court 
competently to litigate the issue; the greater the degree of codifi-
cation or consensus concerning a particular area of the law, the 
more appropriate it is for courts to review foreign acts of state, since 
then it is easier to restrict itself to "the sensitive task of establishing 
a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with inter-
national justice."79 Second, act of state immunity should apply when 
the issue represents a battleground of conflicting ideologies; the 
greater the extent to which the aspects of international law in issue 
touch the political susceptibilities of states, the stronger the justifi-
cation for exclusivity in the political branches, since decisions re-
garding such questions may carry important implications for our 
foreign relations.80 These carefully formulated standards, together 
with the Court's pointed insistence that the scope of the act of state 
doctrine must be determined by reference to "the balance of rele-
vant considerations"81 and its attempt to formulate a narrow hold-
ing, 82 demonstrate that Sabbatino is not absolutist in nature. 
The future application of the act of state doctrine must also be 
considered broadly in its relation to American foreign policy. The 
continuing cold war conflict, combined with the frightening develop-
ment of nuclear weapons, make it imperative that international ten-
sion be relaxed whenever possible. Professor Falk argues that domes-
tic courts can establish a "minimum trust in international relations" 
and thereby contribute to world peace by adjudicating legal contro-
versies so as to protect the autonomy of different socio-political 
systems. 
"Briefly the position is this: in general, municipal courts should 
avoid interference in the domestic affairs of other states when 
the subject matter of disputes illustrates a legitimate diversity of 
values on the part of two national societies. In contrast, if the 
diversity can be said to be illegitimate, as when it exhibits an 
abuse of universal human rights, then domestic courts fulfill 
their role by refusing to further the policy of the foreign legal 
system."88 
79. Principal case at 428, 430 n.34. 
80. Ibid. 
81. Id. at 428. 
82. Ibid. 
83. Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic Courts in the Inter-
national Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16 RUTGERS 
L. R.Ev. 1, 7-8 (1961) (Emphasis added.) (footnote omitted.) "'Legitimate diversity' is a 
phrase used to suggest that there is no global consensus in favor of making a single 
substantive standard universal. Therefore, states are at liberty to adopt diverse national 
standards. Such diversity is legitimate, in this sense, with respect to the practice of 
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Members of the family of nations have organized their internal socie-
ties under different political and economic systems. Capitalist atti-
tudes prevail in some parts of the world; socialist, in others. Under-
developed countries stress the need for importing capital, while 
capital-exporting countries are primarily concerned with protecting 
foreign investors. Amid this diversity, however, there exists con-
siderable consensus on matters of peace and human rights.84 Ameri-
can courts can foster stability in international relations by refusing 
to interfere with a legitimate diversity of economic policies. Expro-
priation of private property, the question involved in Sabbatino, is 
such an economic policy. But when foreign acts of state abridge 
fundamental human rights, American courts should resist the policy 
of the foreign state and promote instead the world consensus. As sug-
gested above,85 the Sabbatino opinion largely reflects this viewpoint, 
and the Court's reasoning seems sufficiently flexible to permit future 
application of the doctrine in accordance with Professor Falk's 
theory. When governmental acts that violate human rights or other 
standards well-supported by a global consensus are challenged in 
American courts, the courts are free to reject act of state immunity. 
v. THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION 
The Court in Sab batino held that the scope of the act of state 
doctrine is a matter of federal law,86 binding upon both the federal 
and state courts. This is a logical corollary of the commitment of 
foreign affairs to the national government; if these important matters 
could be decided in fifty different ways by the states, great confusion 
would result. The Court also concluded that act of state immunity 
is a judicial doctrine, required neither by international law nor by 
the Constitution.87 These conclusions suggest that a congressional 
either socialism or capitalism, but not for the choice belween upholding civil liberties 
or practicing genocide." Falk, The Case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 
Before the Supreme Court of the United Sta1es, 9 How. L.J. 116, 125 n.29 (1963). 
84. Falk, Jurisdiction, Immunities, and Act of State: Suggestions for a Modified 
Approach, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION 1, 5-6 (1961). 
85. See notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text. But the Court may have mis-
applied this theory because, while all nations recognize that aliens deprived of prop-
erty should· be given some compensation, the Court applied act of state immunity to 
Cuba's expropriation even though the compensation plan was illusory. Note, 8 A.B.A. 
SECTION OF INT'L 8: COMP. L. BULL. 28, 31-32 (1964). 
86. The Court stated: "[W]e are constrained to make it clear that an issue con-
cerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary 
and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the 
international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law." 
Principal case at 425. Its declaration that the doctrine was federal law binding on the 
states amounted to a determination that judicially formulated federal common law 
could be controlling in state courts. See generally Henkin, .The Foreign Affairs Power 
of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 805 (1964). 
87. Principal case at 423. 
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act requiring American courts to apply international law as the rule 
of decision in act of state cases would be upheld.88 On October 7, 
1964, the President signed into law the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1964, containing a provision89 overruling the Sabbatino precedent.90 
Introduced as a Senate amendment, the new legislation provides that 
American courts may not refuse to examine the validity of foreign 
acts of state alleged to be contrary to international law. Thus, a 
party who has suffered an expropriation in violation of international 
law may now bring suit to assert his claim to any of the expropriated 
property that later comes within the jurisdiction of the United States. 
The new legislation is particularly interesting because of its re-
strictive terms. The provision extends only to takings of property 
occurring after January I, 1959,91 and then only if international law 
has been violated. The act of state doctrine still applies, therefore, in 
the large category of act of state cases in which international legal 
principles are not violated. The legislation is also inapplicable if the 
case involves rights acquired pursuant to a short-term irrevocable 
letter of credit issued in good faith prior to the foreign state's expro-
priation. Moreover, the rule is temporary, not applying to any case 
in which the proceedings are commenced after January I, 1966. Fi-
nally, act of state immunity will apply as before if the court receives 
a suggestion on behalf of the President to the effect that application 
of the doctrine in the particular case is required to protect foreign 
policy interests of the United States. 
88. Henkin, supra note 86, at 823: "There can be little doubt that the Court would 
have to follow modifications in Act of State by act of Congress •.•. " 
89. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 § 30l(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1013 (1964): " ••• notwith-
standing any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall decline on 
the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits 
giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title 
or other right is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming 
through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after 
January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international 
law, including the principles of compensation and the other standards set out in this 
sub-section: Provided, That this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case 
in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law or with respect 
to a claim of title or other right acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of 
not more than 180 days duration issued in good faith prior to the time of the con-
fiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with respect to which the President deter-
mines that application of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular case 
by the foreign policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is 
filed on his behalf in that case with the court, or (3) in any case in which the 
proceedings are commenced after January I, 1966." 
90. 110 CONG, REc. 18935 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964) (excerpt from report of Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations). But the new law does not affect the result in Sabbatino 
itself. Id. at 18946 (Hickenlooper memorandum). The Executive Branch strongly op-
posed the measure. Hearings on Foreign Assistance Before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 618-19 (1964). 
91. This date marks Castro's takeover in Cuba. 110 CONG. REc. 18935 (daily ed. 
Aug. 14, 1964) (\Vashington Post editorial). 
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Carefully drafted legislation is probably more effective than 
sporadic judicial decisions in discouraging foreign seizures of prop-
erty.92 It was argued that this modification of the Sabbatino decision 
will help deter expropriations by giving notice to the foreign state 
that the product of expropriations violating international law cannot 
be brought within the jurisdiction of the United States without risk 
of litigation.93 But this provision, overshadowed by the violent debate 
on the reapportionment rider, was not subjected to thorough study 
and full hearings.94 Complete review of the matter by the relevant 
congressional committees is planned for the Eighty-ninth Congress to 
determine the need for permanent legislation.95 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While the Sabbatino case endorses the act of state doctrine, it does 
not formulate the absolute rule that, even though the foreign act of 
state is alleged to violate international law, an American court is 
powerless to act in the absence of a Bernstein letter. Rather, it holds 
that, while American courts may not review the validity of expropri-
ations under customary international law, they may review all 
governmental acts, including expropriations, that violate "a treaty 
or other unambiguous agreement."96 Moreover, Sabbatino urges 
courts to approach act of state cases flexibly, determining whether 
the policies underlying the doctrine would be served by its appli-
cation in the particular case.97 Even when the specific prerequisites 
for act of state immunity-execution of the act of state within the 
territory of a presently existing and recognized foreign government 
-are fulfilled, an American court may proceed to review the act's 
validity if it determines that a consensus of the world community 
of nations exists supporting the customary rule violated by the act 
in question and that the case has no important bearing on the con-
duct of foreign relations. The Sabbatino rule, therefore, seems to 
be in the mainstream of policy-oriented jurisprudence. 
William ]. Bogaard 
92. See Laylin, supra note 70, at 36-38. 
93. 110 CoNG. REc. 18948 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964) (rebuttal to Executive Branch 
Position Paper). 
94. 110 CoNG. REc. 22656 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1964) (conference report). 
95. Ibid. 
96. Principal case at 428. 
97. See notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text. 
